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Abstract 
Consumption of fallen stock could be an important route for zoonotic infections to enter 
human populations. Qualitative and Quantitative risk assessments were performed in order to 
determine the risk to human health via consumption of fallen stock and identify potential 
methods for mitigating risk. After initial hazard identification (disease selection) three 
pathogens were chosen for assessment; two for qualitative and one for quantitative. Influenza 
A (H5N1) and the prion causing Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE) and variant 
Creutzfeldt-Jakob Disease (vCJD) were chosen for qualitative assessment. Bacillus anthracis 
was chosen for quantitative assessment. The qualitative assessments were designed to answer 
the question: “In the scenario of a disease outbreak amongst livestock, what is the risk of one 
or more human cases (and deaths) occurring due to the preparation and consumption of fallen 
stock”. The quantitative model was designed to provide probability of infection and 
subsequent death with Gastro-Intestinal (GI) Anthrax occurring in individuals consuming meat 
from fallen cattle, whilst also predicting the number of cases and deaths occurring in Western 
Province (WP), Zambia. The Risk from H5N1 was determined to be “low” to “medium”, and the 
risk from the prion causing BSE was “very low”. Results from the quantitative assessment 
suggest that mean individual risk of infection with GI Anthrax is less than 1 in 10,000,00 but 
that the probability of infection given consumption of an infected carcass was 1 in 4695. The 
mean probability of at least one case of GI Anthrax occurring in WP was 1 in 9. Sensitivity 
analysis of the quantitative model suggested that the ingested dose of B. anthracis was the 
most important determinant of disease, and that the ingested dose was most affected by 
spore reduction during cooking. Qualitative assessment also suggested that risk could be 
reduced by taking precautions when preparing and consuming meat from infected animals 
including careful butchery and ensuring meat is properly cooked. This brief assessment has 
begun to describe the risk to human health from consumption of fallen stock, and has 
provided insights which could be taken forward in to future work. 
Abstract word count = 341 
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Introduction 
The consumption of dead or dying animals is a common practice worldwide, especially in 
developing countries (Turnbull 2008, Islam, Hossain et al. 2013) where fallen stock represent a 
valuable source of protein. Zoonotic infections from these animals may represent an important 
risk to those preparing and consuming meat. This assessment aims to describe the risk from 
three important zoonotic pathogens in order to illustrate the dangers inherent in the practice 
and also to identify potential ways to reduce risk. 
Populations in developed countries were consuming meat from diseased or dead animals as 
recently as the 20th century; “Braxy mutton” refers to the meat of a sheep that has died from 
“braxy” (a Clostridial disease of sheep) or another disease (Wood 1907) and was a term used in 
the UK. This practice continues in developing countries today, due to the scarcity of protein 
and an un-willingness to waste valuable meat. However, the importance of this practice with 
regards to zoonotic disease is poorly understood. This is due in part to legal issues; the 
consumption of meat from dead animals is illegal in most countries. This route of infection 
might be also be important for those living in developing countries.  Consuming meat from 
dead/dying animals could represent an important route for the emergence of diseases of 
global significance. 
According to Taylor et al. (2001) 60% of all infectious diseases are zoonotic and emerging 
infectious diseases are twice as likely to be zoonotic as non-zoonotic. These diseases can 
become pandemics if allowed to spread unchecked; Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza (HPAI) 
(H5N1) is a well-known example (WHO 2005). It is important that we examine and understand 
the potential routes for zoonoses to spread in to human populations. It has been suggested 
that humans first became infected with diseases such as Human Immuno-deficiency Virus and 
Ebola after direct contact with tissue from infected animals (Kalish, Wolfe et al. 2005, Chowell 
and Nishiura 2014). This contact may have been in the form of meat consumption or meat 
preparation.  
To gain a better understanding of the zoonotic disease risks associated with this practice, and 
how we might attempt to control them, we performed a series of three risk assessments 
(qualitative and quantitative). 
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Method for disease selection 
A list of 1415 species of pathogens causing human disease was retrieved from Taylor (2001). 
The list categorises pathogens into bacterial, fungal, protozoal, helminth and viral and other. 
Pathogens were removed from the list if: 
 They were not zoonotic 
 They were not known to cause mortality in infected animals 
 They could not infect humans from an animal carcass. 
 They were fungi. Fungi were excluded due to their lesser potential to cause zoonoses 
of serious public health concern. 
The Pathogens identified were grouped into one of three categories. These categories broadly 
represented groups of pathogens that may behave differently within this context. The three 
categories were: long established pathogens of concern, emerging viruses, and emerging novel 
pathogens e.g. prions. This approach was taken to assess the importance of this practice for a 
range of zoonotic threats. 
One pathogen from each group was chosen based on the strength of the available literature 
necessary to perform a risk assessment. 
Results from disease selection 
Table 1 Showing pathogens fulfilling criteria for risk assessment, grouped by type 
Pathogen Type 
Bacterial Viral Parasitic (Protozoal) Other 
 Bacillus anthracis 
 Leptospira spp. 
 Salmonella spp. 
 Escherichia coli 
 Listeria 
Monocytogenes 
 Sterptococcus spp. 
 Clostridium spp. 
 Corynebacterium 
ulcerans 
 Campylobacter spp. 
 Chlamydophila 
pssitaci 
 Erysipelothrix 
rhusiopathiae 
 Francisella tularensis 
 Yersinia spp. 
 
 Crimean Congo 
Haemorrhagic Fever 
virus (Nairovirus) 
 Rift Valley fever virus 
(Phlebovirus) 
 Influenza A virus 
 Flaviviruses 
 Newcastle disease 
virus 
 Rotaviruses 
 Pseudorabies virus 
 
 Sarcocystis spp. 
 Toxoplasma gondii 
 
 The BSE causative 
agent (prion) 
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Part I: Qualitative 
Introduction 
The two pathogens chosen for qualitative risk assessment were Influenza A virus (H5N1) and 
the prion causing Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE) and variant Creutzfeldt–Jakob 
Disease (vCJD). These pathogens fit all the criteria described above and both are well known as 
the causative agents of zoonotic disease (Brown 2001, Peiris, de Jong et al. 2007). 
Influenza A strain H5N1 causing HPAI has caused many outbreaks of disease amongst domestic 
poultry (Sonnberg, Webby et al. 2013) and to date has caused 844 cases and 449 deaths 
amongst humans worldwide (WHO 2015). There have been major concerns about the 
emergence of HPAI H5N1 as a virulent pandemic strain. 
The outbreak of Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy in the UK during the 1980-90’s has been 
well documented and much research carried out on the infectious agent, the prion known 
as PrP𝑆𝑐. The prion is the cause of vCJD in humans (Brown 2001), and a vCJD outbreak in the 
UK was associated with the outbreak of BSE amongst cattle. The discovery of this novel 
pathogen, potentially fatal to humans and which appeared to be very widely distributed 
amongst UK cattle, caused mass hysteria, not just in the UK but worldwide.  
In order to assess the importance of consumption of deadstock in the transmission and 
emergence of these pathogens the following risk question was investigated: 
“In the scenario of a disease outbreak amongst livestock, what is the risk of one or more 
human cases (and deaths) occurring due to the preparation and consumption of fallen stock” 
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1. The disease causes animal deaths, or animals 
are culled due to morbidity. 
2. Animal carcasses are salvaged 
for consumption 
3a. Individual is exposed to pathogen via the 
consumption of meat from an infected 
carcass 
3b. Individual is exposed to pathogen via 
preparation of carcass before consumption. 
4. The pathogen establishes an infection 
5. The infection causes the death of the 
individual. 
Method 
Once the risk question was decided upon, a risk pathway was drawn. The pathway had to 
describe all of the necessary steps that would allow the pathogen to cause cases in people 
after cases had occurred in livestock. The final draft of the pathway can be seen in Figure 1 and 
this pathway was used for both pathogens. 
Figure 1: Risk Pathway for qualitative risk assessment. 
Figure 1: Risk Pathway based on the question “In the scenario of a disease outbreak amongst livestock, what is the 
risk of one or more human cases (and deaths) occurring due to the preparation and consumption of fallen stock”, 
showing steps in the pathway used to assess risk. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
For each pathogen in turn, a qualitative risk was assigned to each step in the pathway, from 
“negligible” to “very high”, reflecting the probability of the event described occurring given 
that all previous steps had occurred. Definitions of risk are the same as those used by the 
European Food Standards Agency, discussed in EFSA’s own journal (2012). A Summary of the 
definitions can be found in Table 1. Individual step risks were decided upon after literature 
review. 
Once all steps had been assigned a risk, a final risk for the pathogen based on the judgement 
of the author and following standard risk assessment methodology (Thiemann 2015) was 
produced to answer the risk question.  
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Table 2: Definitions of risk 
Table 2. Definitions of qualitative risk used by the European Food Standards Agency 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Results 
Individual risks for steps in the pathway described can be seen in Table 2 (H5N1) and Table 3 
(BSE & vCJD) 
For H5N1 the overall risk was considered to be low-medium. We can expect there to be human 
cases of infection with H5N1 via the preparation of infected carcasses, and infected individuals 
are at significant risk of death. 
For BSE and vCJD, the overall risk was considered to be very low. We might expect people to 
become exposed to the infectious prion through consumption of meat from fallen stock in 
some contexts. But, these individuals are unlikely to develop disease. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Descriptor Definition 
Negligible So rare that it does not merit to be considered 
Very low Unlikely to occur 
Low Rare, but may occur occasionally occur 
Medium Occurs regularly 
High Occurs very regularly 
Very High Is almost certain to occur 
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Table 3: Qualitative risk estimates for H5N1. 
Table 3 Qualitative estimates for each step in the pathway described in Figure 1, showing the necessary steps for a pathogen (Influenza A H5N1) to infect humans via 
consumption of fallen stock (poultry) 
Step Description Risk Supporting evidence and Source 
1 The disease causes 
animal deaths, or 
Very High  Mortality may be as high as 100% in some outbreaks amongst poultry. (Alexander 2000, Bui, Dao et al. 2014) 
 Any animals that do not die from the disease are likely to be culled as part of disease control.((OIE) 2007)  
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animals are culled due 
to morbidity. 
2 Animal carcasses are 
salvaged for 
consumption 
 
Medium  Although it is highly recommended that any infected birds are disposed of safely, in some countries people 
continue to salvage dead or dying birds to eat. (Olsen, Laosiritaworn et al. 2005) 
3a Individual is exposed to 
pathogen via the 
consumption of meat 
from an infected carcass 
Low  No epidemiological data suggests that humans can become infected with the virus through consumption of 
properly cooked food. (INFOSAN 2005) 
 Some studies have shown no significant association between eating of poultry products and H5N1 disease 
(Mounts, Kwong et al. 1999) 
 Consumption of raw or undercooked poultry products infected with H5N1 may result in exposure and 
infection. (WHO 2005, Peiris, de Jong et al. 2007) 
3b Individual is exposed to 
pathogen via 
preparation of carcass 
before consumption. 
Medium  Preparing poultry that have died or have been slaughtered due to infection has been implicated in human 
outbreaks of disease. (Chotpitayasunondh, Ungchusak et al. 2005, Dinh, Long et al. 2006, Peiris, de Jong et 
al. 2007) 
4 The pathogen 
establishes an infection 
 
Low - Medium  In some outbreaks amongst poultry there have been fewer human cases than expected (Vong, Coghlan et al. 
2006). The overall infectiousness of H5N1 is unclear. (Peiris, de Jong et al. 2007).  
5 The infection causes the 
death of the individual. 
Medium-High  At present, with 449 deaths from 844 documented cases, the case-fatality rate of H5N1 is over 50% (WHO 
2015). However, with mild case ascertainment being poor, it is very possible that the majority of cases have 
gone unreported and so mortality could be much lower (Peiris, de Jong et al. 2007).  
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Table 4: Qualitative risk estimates for BSE & vCJD 
Table 4 Qualitative estimates for each step in the pathway described in Figure 1, showing the necessary steps for a pathogen (prion causing BSE and vCJD) to infect humans 
via consumption of fallen stock (cattle)
Step Description Risk Supporting evidence and Source 
1 The disease causes animal 
deaths, or animals are 
culled due to morbidity. 
Very High  Cattle that aren’t culled will die as a result of the disease. (Kimberlin 1993) 
2 Animal carcasses are 
salvaged for consumption 
 
Very Low - 
Medium 
 In developing countries, these animals are likely to be salvaged for consumption, especially since a disease outbreak 
would be a novel occurrence. In investigations of other diseases, such as Anthrax, preparation of dead cattle for 
consumption has been seen as common practice (Munang'andu, Banda et al. 2012, Islam, Hossain et al. 2013). 
 In developed countries, carcasses from animals slaughtered due to suspicion of BSE are very unlikely to enter the food 
chain. The “TSE regulation” issued by the European commission in 2001 requires that the animal products from suspected 
or confirmed cases are disposed of as category 1 material, i.e. they cannot be used in products intended for human 
consumption. Similarly any fallen stock over a certain age must be tested for BSE before they can enter the food chain for 
human consumption (EC 2001) 
3a Individual is exposed to 
pathogen via the 
consumption of meat from 
an infected carcass 
Negligible – 
Medium  
 Individuals consuming un-processed meat from infected carcasses are probably at low risk of exposing themselves to the 
infective prion, as muscle tissue appears to be free of the infectious agent in affected animals (Brown 2001). 
 Those individuals consuming meat that contains tissue deemed “Specified Risk Material” will almost certainly expose 
themselves to the prion. The prion does not lose infectivity at temperatures normally achieved in cooking (Matsuura, 
Ishikawa et al. 2013).  
3b Individual is exposed to 
pathogen via preparation 
of carcass before 
consumption. 
Negligible  The literature suggests that infection requires exposure to the pathogen via ingestion (Hilton 2006).  
4 The pathogen establishes 
an infection 
 
Low  The outbreak of BSE amongst cattle in the UK totalled over 100,000 cases with 1000’s of people potentially exposed to 
the infectious agent (Chen and Wang 2014). However, there have only been 176 cases of vCJD in the UK. There is some 
suggestion that this is due to inherent genetic susceptibility in some individuals (Saba and Booth 2013), however there 
may also be other factors, such as age, at play (Brown 2001). 
5 The infection causes the 
death of the individual. 
Very High  There is no known cure for the disease, and infection appears to unanimously result in death. (de Villemeur 2013) 
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Discussion 
The risk of human infections with H5N1 as a result of preparing and consuming infected birds 
was considered to be low-medium; we can expect cases to occur as a result of this practice 
following an outbreak. This represents an important step in disease emergence, especially 
considering that infections may be sub-clinical and therefore difficult to recognise and control. 
The risk of human cases of vCJD as a result of preparing and consuming cattle that have died or 
been slaughtered as a result of BSE was considered to be very low.  
The method used is fairly brief and simplistic, and may fail to take into account some nuances 
of these diseases and there is uncertainty associated with these assessments. For example, 
disease outbreaks amongst animals and their risk to humans are likely to vary. Some regions 
may have seen cases before, and people may be more or less likely to consume meat from 
deadstock. Previous outbreaks may lead to a change in risk perception and behaviour 
following control measures such as public health education programmes (Chotpitayasunondh, 
Ungchusak et al. 2005). 
The cultural differences between countries means that practices surrounding food vary hugely, 
in some South East Asian countries, consumption of poultry blood is common. This is likely to 
increase an individual’s risk of disease (Peiris, de Jong et al. 2007). 
BSE and vCJD are unusual diseases. BSE has a very long incubation period (Kimberlin 1993), 
and so many cattle are likely to die as a result of other causes before BSE can cause obvious 
symptoms or death. As a result, there may be a higher risk from consuming animals that die of 
other causes, but are also infected with BSE.  
The assessment has given clues to interventions that may reduce the risk of human illness 
through relatively simple methods. The absence of the infectious prion from the meat and milk 
of infected animals (Brown 2001) means that with the removal of the central nervous system 
and other specified risk materials, meat from diseased carcasses could be treated as safe.  
From this risk assessment, it certainly seems possible that human cases of these diseases may 
arise through the preparation and consumption of fallen stock. The findings may help guide 
future work into the ways in which zoonotic diseases emerge into human populations. 
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Part II: Quantitative 
Introduction 
The pathogen chosen for the quantitative part of the assessment was the bacterium Bacillus 
anthracis, the cause of Anthrax in both humans and animals. This pathogen was chosen 
because of its prevalence in many developing countries where the practice of consuming fallen 
stock is most common (Turnbull 2008), and also because of the quantitative data available in 
the literature.  
B. anthracis is well-known as a zoonosis that can be spread to others after an individual has 
died, often through direct physical contact or via contamination of the environment and 
subsequent infection, sometimes years later (Turnbull 2008). The bacterium can be found in 
two forms: the vegetative form which is found within infected hosts, and the spore form. The 
spore is formed to allow the bacteria to survive in harsher environmental conditions, such as 
soil. 
Anthrax has proven historically difficult to control, with cases occurring in developed countries 
after supposedly long periods without the disease. Anthrax is still endemic or “hyper-endemic” 
in many developing countries (Doganay and Demiraslan 2015). Zambia in is one of these 
“hyper-endemic” countries and both human and animal cases are seen year on year (Turnbull 
2008).  
Anthrax seems particularly relevant to this investigation. Specifically, the gastro-intestinal 
forms of the disease seemed worth investigating. In order to focus the quantitative risk 
assessment, it was decided that the project should investigate Anthrax in the Western 
Province (WP) of Zambia.  
Western Province is a relatively poor part of Zambia. With a population of approximately 
900,000 people with 60% living in rural areas (CSO 2011), most inhabitants purchase food from 
local markets and/or produce their own with little formal food safety regulation. The province 
is broadly representative of other rural communities in the developing world and was 
considered to be a suitable site for this study. Further to this, knowledge of Anthrax is good 
and there have been several studies into the epidemiology of the disease within the region 
(Siamudaala, Bwalya et al. 2006, Munang'andu, Banda et al. 2012, Munang'andu, Banda et al. 
2012).  
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In order to investigate the importance of consuming deadstock in the epidemiology of Anthrax 
we conducted a quantitative risk assessment to estimate the number of GI cases (and deaths) 
of Anthrax we might expect each year in the Western province of Zambia. In addition to this, 
we also wished to estimate any given individual’s probability of exposure to Anthrax via 
ingestion, and the probability that an individual will become infected with Anthrax given that 
they consume meat from an animal that has died of Anthrax.  
Method 
The model used for the quantitative assessment was based on the same pathway mentioned 
in the qualitative part of the assessment, and can be seen in Figure 1.  
Data used to construct the model was taken from the available literature and also from 
interviews and meetings with government veterinary services and researchers conducted on a 
field trip to Western Province, Zambia. These Meetings included a participatory workshop to 
find out more about food preparation practices in Nalitoya, Senanga District, WP. 
The model was constructed in Excel 2013 (Microsoft corporation) using @RISK6 (Palisade 
corporation). The software uses monte-carlo simulation to produce a model from input 
distributions and data. A full description of the model can be found in Table 5. Outputs from 
the model were meant to address the aims described in the introduction, which were: 
1. To estimate the average number of cases and deaths in humans from GI Anthrax in 
WP, Zambia, as a result preparing and eating fallen stock (cattle) 
2. To estimate an individual’s probability of death following exposure to a minimal 
infectious dose of B. anthracis sufficient to cause GI Anthrax, in WP, Zambia. 
a. And probability of exposure without death. 
3. To estimate an individual’s probability of becoming infected with GI Anthrax, given 
that they consumed meat from cattle that has died of Anthrax. 
4. To estimate the probability that at least one human death due to GI Anthrax will occur 
in a single year in WP due to consumption of deadstock. 
a. And the probability of at least one case occurring in a single year. 
The mean, median, 5th and 95th percentile for each output were taken from the model for 
results. 
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Sensitivity analysis was then performed for three of the outputs to determine which input 
parameters were most influential and to identify potential targets for interventions. The 
software varies the input parameters within their permitted numerical ranges for each output 
and then ranks the inputs according to which had the largest effect on the output’s mean. The 
software also calculates regression coefficients between the outputs and the input 
parameters. The outputs chosen were:  
1. An individual’s probability of death following exposure to Minimum Infectious Dose 
(MID) of B. anthracis sufficient to cause GI Anthrax. 
2. An individual’s probability of death given that they have consumed meat from cattle 
that have died of Anthrax. 
3. The probability that at least one death due to GI Anthrax will occur in a single year in 
WP. 
Additional sensitivity analysis was performed on the “number of spores consumed by an 
individual”.
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Table 5: Quantitative model, outputs, inputs and distributions/formulae used. 
Table 5. Table showing all input parameters for quantitative model of Gastro-intestinal Anthrax in Humans due to consumption of fallen stock (cattle). All inputs, formulae and distributions are 
included. 
Parameter/Output Components (including type of 
distribution used) 
Input Distribution/formulae Description 
Probability that an 
individual Bovine 
dies as a result of 
Anthrax 
Under-reporting for cattle 
anthrax cases. 
Uniform (0.1, 0.4) A uniform distribution was used to predict the proportion of cases of anthrax in cattle that go 
unreported. The distribution was based on data from personal communication (Kamboyi 
2015) which stated that 10-40% are unreported. 
Average Annual number of 
cases of Anthrax in Cattle, in 
Western Province, Zambia. 
Negative Binomial (Annual 
reported cases, under-
reporting estimate) 
Data taken from annual livestock reports dating from 1999 to 2014 (Nyekele 2011, 
Munang'andu, Banda et al. 2012, Syatwinda 2012, Syatwinda 2013, Syatwinda 2014, 
Syatwinda 2015), combined with an estimate of under-reporting. For each year the reported 
cases of anthrax in cattle were added to an estimate of the un-reported cases. The estimate of 
un-reported cases was made using a negative binomial distribution, which combined the 
reported cases with the under-reporting estimate to give a number of un-reported cases. 
Annual case estimates were then combined to produce a mean annual number of cases. 
Probability of cattle dying from 
anthrax (Beta distribution) 
Beta (Mean annual cattle 
anthrax cases +1, Cattle 
population – (Mean annual 
cattle anthrax cases + 1)) 
A beta distribution was used to estimate the probability of any given cattle dying from 
Anthrax, based on the average number of cases and a total cattle population size of 475000 
(taken from livestock reports) of WP. 
Probability that a 
carcass is salvaged 
Probability that a carcass is 
salvaged (Uniform distribution) 
Uniform(0.9-1.0) The probability of cattle carcasses being salvaged for consumption (90-100%) was plotted in a 
uniform distribution, based on personal communication from (Kamboyi 2015). 
Probability that an 
individual 
consumes an oral 
MID of B. 
anthracis 
sufficient to cause 
GI Anthrax 
Colony Forming Units (CFU) in 
carcass (Poisson Distribution) 
Poisson (55*10
8
*150) A Poisson distribution estimating the number of colony forming units (CFU) of B.anthracis in a 
carcass. Based on 10
8
 cfu/ml (Turnbull 2008), a mean of 55 ml of blood /Kg Body Weight 
(Reynolds 1953) and a mean Body Weight of 150Kg. 
Proportion of CFU's sporulating 
(Uniform distribution) 
Uniform (0.2-1.0)  A uniform distribution used to estimate the proportion of CFU's that sporulate. Based on data 
from Turnbull (2008). 
Proportion of all spores 
remaining after cooking 
(Betapert distribution) 
Betapert (0,0.001,1) An estimate of the proportion of spores that will survive cooking, based on cooking 
temperature of <100 degrees Celsius and cooking time of 1-2 hours (from community 
workshop), and data from studies on Spore survival under heat (Murray 1931) (Rice, Rose et 
al. 2004). 
Number of portions eaten 
(Betapert distribution) 
Betapert (1,3,10) 
 
An estimate of the number of portions an individual will eat, based on answers given in the 
community workshop. Mean portion size = 100g. 
Spores consumed by an 
individual. 
(CFU’s in 
carcass/1500)*(Proportion of 
CFU’s sporulating)*(Proportion 
of all spores remaining after 
cooking)*(Number of portions 
eaten) 
An estimate of the total number of spores consumed by an individual, based on total carcass 
contamination (divided by the number of portions in a carcass ≈ 1500) multiplied by the 
proportion of CFU’s sporulating, the proportion of spores surviving cooking and the average 
number of portions eaten. 
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Uncertainty in the MID for a 
human case of GI Anthrax 
(Uniform) 
Uniform (10
8
,10
11
) The Minimal infectious Dose (MID) required for infection with GI anthrax is uncertain in 
humans. A uniform distribution was used to account for this. The lowest oral MID was 
believed to be 10
8
 spores, based on (Turnbull 2008) reported MID's for other resistant species. 
The highest was 10
11
 spores, based on available human data in (Turnbull 2008) 
Probability that an individual 
consumes an oral MID of b. 
anthracis sufficient to cause GI 
Anthrax. (Fitted) 
(IF Average spores consumed 
≥ human MID, then 1 else 0) 
Using Monte-carlo simulation, the probability that the number of spores consumed was 
greater than the estimated oral MID in humans was determined. In each separate iteration of 
the model, if the dose consumed by an individual was larger than the MID, +1 was added to a 
counter, at the end of the simulation, we are able to see how likely the ingested dose is to 
exceed the human MID. A continuous distribution was fitted to this result.  
Probability of 
death given GI 
infection with b. 
anthracis 
Probability of death given GI 
infection with b. anthracis 
(Uniform) 
Uniform (0.25, 0.60) Uniform probability of death based on mortality estimate of 25-60%. Based on CDC reports. 
(Thira and Arthur 2002) (Centers for Disease Control and Prevention 2009) 
Output 1 (Number 
of cases) 
Number of deaths in cattle due 
to Anthrax (Binomial) 
Binomial(P of death in cattle in 
WP due to Anthrax, WP cattle 
population) 
Using the probability of death occurring in cattle (P1) and the total number of cattle in 
Binomial distribution, the annual number of cattle deaths can be estimated 
Number of people/carcass 
(Uniform) 
Uniform (100, 200) An estimate of the number of people consuming one carcass based on answers from the 
community workshop. 
Number of infections/carcass 
(Binomial) 
Binomial (P of individual 
consuming oral MID, Number 
of people/carcass) 
Estimated number of human infections from one carcass using the number of people/carcass 
and the probability of an individual consuming an MID together in a binomial distribution. 
Annual human cases (Estimated annual cattle 
deaths due to Anthrax in 
WP)*(Number of human 
infections/carcass) 
Cattle deaths combined with the number of human infections per carcass provides an 
estimated annual number of cases. 
Output 2 (Number 
of Deaths) 
Annual human deaths (Annual human cases)*(P of 
death given GI infection with 
Anthrax) 
As for Output 1, but combined with P4. 
Output 3 
(Probability of at 
least one case) 
Probability of at least one case 
GI Anthrax occurring in WP in a 
single year, due to 
consumption of fallen cattle 
1-(1-Individual probability of 
infection)^(Rural population of 
WP) 
The probability of an individual not being infected with GI Anthrax via consumption of 
deadstock is (1-Individual probability of infection), therefore the probability of at least one 
case occurring is 1-(1-individual p of infection) to the power of the rural population of WP 
(528974 inhabitants) (CSO 2011). 
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Results 
Output results from quantitative analysis can be seen in Table 6. From the model, the mean 
annual deaths we can expect from GI Anthrax in Western Province is 4.1 (median 0.0, min 5%: 
0.0, max 95%: 49.0). The mean annual number of cases of GI Anthrax is 10.52 (median 0.0, min 
5%: 0.0, max 95%: 126.0). A given individual’s mean annual probability of becoming infected 
with GI Anthrax and dying was 6.23 x 10-8 or 1 in 15873016 and mean annual probability of 
becoming infected was 1.46 x 10-7 or 1 in 6849315. The probability of an individual becoming 
infected with GI Anthrax, given that they had consumed meat from an infected carcass was 
0.000213 or 1 in 4695. The mean probability of at least one human case occurring was 0.114 
(median 0.0842, min 5% 0.00657, max 95% 0.325) 
Results of sensitivity analysis can be seen in Table 7. For all three outputs, the most influential 
input was the probability that the ingested dose of Anthrax spores was greater than the oral 
MID for GI Anthrax. The other inputs in rank order were, probability of death given infection 
with GI Anthrax, probability of death occurring in cattle due to Anthrax and finally, the 
probability that a carcass will be salvaged for consumption. The most influential parameter 
affecting the number of spores an individual receives when consuming meat from an infected 
carcass was the proportion of spores remaining after cooking. The other parameters in rank 
order were: portions of meat eaten, proportion of CFU’s sporulating and the total CFU’s in an 
infected carcass. 
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Table 6: Results from quantitative analysis 
Table 6 Results from quantitative model of GI Anthrax in humans due to consumption of fallen stock. 
Showing output means, medians, Minimum 5th and Maximum 95th percentile values 
  Mean Median Min 5% 
value 
Max 95% 
value 
Number of human deaths from GI 
Anthrax 
4.1 0 0 49 
Number of human cases of GI Anthrax 10.52 0 0 126 
The probability of an individual dying 
as a result of GI Anthrax from 
consumption of fallen stock. 
6.22E-08 4.01E-09 2.92E-09 1.95E-07 
The probability of an individual 
becoming infected with GI Anthrax 
from consumption of fallen stock. 
1.46E-07 9.99E-08 7.40E-09 4.40E-07 
The probability that an individual will 
become infected with GI Anthrax, 
given that they consume meat from a 
carcass infected with Anthrax 
0.000213 0.0001426 1.02E-05 0.0006632 
The probability of at least one case of 
GI Anthrax occurring in WP in a single 
year due to the consumption of fallen 
stock. 
0.114 0.0842 0.00657 0.325 
The probability of at least one death 
caused by infection with GI Anthrax 
occurring in WP in a single year due to 
the consumption of fallen stock. 
0.0317 0.0214 0.00158 0.0982 
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Table 7: Results from Sensitivity analysis 
Table 6. Results from sensitivity analysis of key outputs and inputs of the quantitative risk model for GI 
Anthrax in humans as a result of consumption of fallen stock (cattle). Showing regression co-efficients, 
minimum and maximum changes in output means based on input variation and uncertainty. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Output/parameter 
(mean) 
Input 
Regression 
Co-efficient 
Change in Output mean 
Minimum output value Maximum output value 
Individual 
probability of 
dying from GI 
Anthrax following 
consumption of 
meat from fallen 
stock (6.20E-08) 
Probability that 
ingested dose > human 
MID 0.93 3.19E-09 2.04E-07 
Probability of death 
given infection with GI 
Anthrax 0.22 4.01E-08 8.48E-08 
Probability that death 
occurs in an individual 
bovine 0.13 5.00E-08 7.68E-08 
Probability that a 
carcass will be salvaged 
for consumption 0.03 5.78E-08 6.70E-08 
Individual 
probability of 
dying from GI 
Anthrax given 
consumption of 
meat from an 
infected carcass 
(2.12E-04) 
Probability that 
ingested dose > human 
MID 0.95 1.09E-05 6.96E-04 
Probability of death 
given infection with GI 
Anthrax 
0.23 1.38E-04 2.91E-04 
Probability of at 
least one death 
occurring due to GI 
Anthrax caused by 
consumption of 
fallen cattle in WP 
(0.0317) 
Probability that 
ingested dose > human 
MID 0.93 0.00169 0.101 
Probability of death 
given infection with GI 
Anthrax 0.22 0.0208 0.0429 
Probability that death 
occurs in an individual 
bovine 0.13 0.0257 0.0390 
Probability that a 
carcass will be salvaged 
for consumption 0.03 0.0296 0.0340 
Number of B. 
antrhacis spores 
received by an 
individual when 
consuming meat 
from an infected 
carcass 
(213376973) 
Proportion of spores 
remaining after cooking -0.85 12761806 608946922 
Portions eaten 0.36 86126081 402828162 
Proportion of CFU's 
sporulating 0.34 79929932 344131999 
CFU's in an infected 
carcass -0.01 205264403 222575201 
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Discussion 
The risk to any individuals consuming meat from a carcass infected with Anthrax is very low, 
with a probability of becoming infected with GI Anthrax of less than 1 in 1000. The risk of any 
individual coming into contact with an infected carcass and then becoming infected is 
negligible. The probability of at least one case occurring in a year is 0.114, and from this we 
might conclude that while individual probability is very low, we certainly can’t rule out cases 
occurring via this route in this region, let alone on a global or national scale. This risk could also 
vary between groups of people. Those with weaker immune responses such as the very young 
and old may experience a higher risk than described here. 
Results from the sensitivity analysis suggest that the most important factors in determining 
whether someone becomes infected and dies as a result of infection with Anthrax through 
consumption of deadstock is the dose they receive. The parameter with the greatest influence 
over the dose received is the proportion of spores that survive cooking. 
The results produced are coherent with the reported experience of Anthrax within Western 
Province. At the turn of the 21st century, people in Western Province experienced a few deaths 
each year and the number has been steadily declining and in some years no cases were 
reported. This is similar to the pattern of disease amongst cattle and several studies 
undertaken in Zambia have linked human cases to the preparation and consumption of 
infected meat (Siamudaala, Bwalya et al. 2006, Munang'andu, Banda et al. 2012).  
There are several features of the model that need to be considered when interpreting the 
results. The estimate of the total CFU’s within a carcass is based on the author’s own 
calculations and total carcass contamination could be affected by a number of factors 
including variations in breed, physiology, different approaches to butchery of fallen stock and 
the time between death and salvage of a carcass. Equally, the proportion of B. anthracis cells 
sporulating is likely to be affected by factors not included in the model.  The model could be 
much improved by a greater understanding of the exact nature of sporulation, the time it takes 
in field conditions and to what extent it occurs. Human cases could also occur through other 
important mechanisms of infection, such as the contamination of cooked food with vegetative 
cells. This aspect of the study would be a good choice to form the basis of further work. 
The uncertainty of the oral MID of B. anthracis required to cause GI anthrax had a large impact 
on the model outputs. Unfortunately, the data of GI Anthrax in humans is incomplete, due in 
part to its rarity in the developed world. The model allows for this uncertainty and useful 
conclusions can still be drawn from the results. 
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Public health officials in Zambia have focused on persuading people not to eat meat from 
fallen stock as a method of controlling the diseases in humans (Munang'andu, Banda et al. 
2012), but the practice continues. From the sensitivity analysis, it is possible to make 
suggestions about other methods to reduce risk. The proportion of spores surviving cooking 
can be easily influenced. Whilst carcass rejection and destruction is best practice, this is 
unlikely to occur in a setting where diets are deficient in protein. Ensuring the temperature of 
a cooking medium is high enough to sterilise B. anthracis spores should significantly reduce the 
risk to individuals consuming the meat. Another parameter that could be artificially controlled 
is the probability that cattle become infected.  Zambian officials have continued to issue 
vaccine against Anthrax in order to control the disease in cattle, but have been frustrated by 
inadequate coverage, which has allowed outbreaks to continue (Siamudaala, Bwalya et al. 
2006). Promoting protocols for reducing soil contamination are also recommended; in our 
community workshop there was a lack of awareness of the dangers of environmental 
contamination. 
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Conclusions 
Preparing and consuming meat from fallen stock can pose a risk to human health. Influenza A 
strain H5N1 has infected humans after direct contact with infected carcasses during meat 
preparation and could pose a threat to those consuming undercooked poultry products. The 
prion causing BSE in cattle is unlikely to cause cases of vCJD in humans through this route, but 
the possibility cannot be ruled out. Whilst the risk to individuals from GI Anthrax appears low, 
human cases are likely where fallen cattle are consumed in Anthrax endemic regions. 
Preparing and cooking meat from infected carcasses could affect the risk from eating meat 
from dead animals. Continual public education about risk from zoonoses and the importance 
of safe cooking practices can help to reduce individual risk and also reduce the chance of 
epidemics occurring.  
The assessments were meant to consider several different types of pathogen and as a result, 
the findings of this study could apply to other pathogens that can infect humans via this route 
(see Table 1). However, the differences between pathogen epidemiology and ecology mean 
that we should expect pathogens to behave differently and therefore further investigation is 
recommended. 
Very little work has focused on this practice. This brief study has looked into the potential 
hazards people face from consumption of fallen stock and can inform future work. 
Consumption of fallen stock poses a real threat to human health, and could exist as a route 
through which diseases emerge into human populations. Simply telling people not to engage in 
the practice is unlikely to work and greater focus should be placed on allowing people to 
prepare food safely. However, further work is required before the risks and solutions can be 
fully understood. 
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